Municipal Challenge to Affordable Housing Law Fails

I have posited as a basic economic principle “that as a general rule people will tend to act in what they perceive to be their (economic, political, social) best interest.”

What is true at the individual level remains true in the aggregate; case in point: municipal governments and housing. New Jersey has over 500 municipalities, each largely funded by the local property tax and dedicated to the concept of home rule and the political survival of incumbent office holders. The greatest and most basic gripe of the local voter is that property taxes are too high, and a major component of that tax burden is the school tax which is directly related to the number of children attending the locally supported public schools.

It is not surprising, therefore, that municipalities will encourage development that generates tax revenue without increasing the need to provide local services, especially as represented by school children. This motive is often, but not always, openly acknowledged; sometimes it will be camouflaged by citing planning concepts such as preservation of the environment or the character of the area and the prevention of suburban sprawl, some of which the advocates may actually believe (in addition to the core goal of making sure unwanted development happens elsewhere, that “someone else” will bear the cost).

To limit school children, these municipalities seek to limit the residential development that will generate school children, at least in numbers that will exceed the new housing’s proportionate contribution to the local property tax base. Techniques to do this include limiting housing to single-family homes of a certain minimum size on large lots (ironically causing the very suburban sprawl used to justify the regulation in the first place).

Home builders are in business to make a profit. Faced with these regulations they will build the expensive, luxury housing that the local government will at least tolerate. But if the regulations were otherwise, they might build significantly more homes on the same land that might be within the reach of the less wealthy.

In the 1970s New Jersey’s Supreme Court issued its decision in cases challenging this misuse of the local zoning power. In what has become known as the Mount Laurel Doctrine, the Court held as a matter of state constitutional law that developing municipalities must use their zoning power to provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of their fair share of housing affordable to low and moderate income households. The initial decision generated litigation, not housing, so in 1983 the Court created the “builders remedy,” an incentive for profit-seeking enterprises to propose the construction of housing in significantly greater density than would otherwise be permitted so long as a substantial percentage was “affordable.”

Fast forward 40 years. The Legislature responded by enacting the Fair Housing Act which created the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) to create specific regulations to determine each town’s obligation and what housing would qualify as a credit against the obligation and grant “substantive certification” to protect compliant towns from the dreaded builder’s remedy. Municipalities that did not participate in the COAH process took the risk that they might be sued. Still, the whole idea that someone else could tell a municipality what to do, especially in a way that was inconsistent with its own parochial interests, continued to rankle. COAH was never able to adopt rules for the third housing round that passed judicial muster and ultimately the Supreme Court removed the requirement that potential Mount Laurel plaintiffs exhaust (plainly unavailable) administrative remedies before initiating exclusionary zoning litigation.

Instead of state-wide standards for determining the municipal obligation and compliance techniques, there was the potential for considerable variation depending upon where the case was tried. Most municipalities sought to settle these claims, but the parties were limited in their ability to justify the numbers offered and demanded. A few towns took the risk of litigation, resulting in trials that were battles of the planning experts and generally were not as advantageous to the municipal positions as they had hoped.

In 2024 the Legislature passed a statute eliminating COAH and providing a substitute administrative process. When the resulting municipal obligations were published, there as widespread complaint that they were too high. A coalition of towns sued to overturn that act and sought preliminary relief pausing not only its process, but the entire Mount Laurel obligation until their suit was resolved.

Last week the trial court judge denied that relief.1 There are lots of issues discussed in the decision (it’s long, but not unnecessarily so, and largely accessible even without a law degree), but many keep coming back to the point that the law which the coalition was challenging is not in reality the source of the grievance. Municipalities that are not willing to accept the numbers determined in accordance with that statue do not have to participate in the process; just as before the statute was passed they may bring their own declaratory judgment actions seeking to establish their preferred numbers or do nothing and take the risk of an exclusionary zoning lawsuit. The statute does not limit these choices.

The coalition’s real beef is with the Mount Laurel Doctrine itself. But people have to live somewhere. At its core the Mount Laurel Doctrine is not about charity housing but that municipalities may not use their governmental power to make themselves enclaves for the wealthy. If certain types of development impose what a town considers to be an unfair burden (relative to its neighbors) to pay for education, I suggest that responsibility for that public service be transferred from the local to the state level.

Jay Bohn

January 6, 2025

Copyright 2025 by Jay Bohn.

  1. Thanks to Redevelop NJ for this link: https://www.redevelopnj.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/561/2025/01/MER-L-1778-24-Order-Denying-Plaintiffs_-Requests-for-Injuctive-Relief.pdf ↩︎

NJ’s Opposition to Congestion Pricing Is All About the Money

I hope those New Jersey residents who drive into lower Manhattan aren’t counting on Govenor Murphy to stand for (their) principles in his battle with New York governor Kathy Hochul over Sunday’s impending start of “congestion pricing,” a money grab that will charge cars $9 to enter Manhattan south of 60th Street. Of course, there are those who insist that the purpose of the plan is to encourage commuters to find an alternative to driving in, but the NY State law that authorized congestion pricing requires that it raise $1 billion a year for New York’s transportation projects. And it doesn’t hurt that a lot of the people paying the tax to enter the holy land of lower Manhattan are from New Jersey.

(You may recall that Governor Hochul “paused” the implementation of congestion pricing to avoid hurting NY democrats in the November election. It was unpaused a few weeks later.)

A number of lawsuits have challenged the scheme, but until recently New Jersey’s was the last one with a chance to keep congestion pricing from taking effect as scheduled. Although the court hearing that suit ruled that more environmental analysis is needed, both sides are claiming victory on whether it will start on Sunday.

There are apparently settlement negotiations (secret of course), but it appears that the question is not whether there should be congestion pricing or how much drivers will pay, but what will be New Jersey’s cut. Supposedly there was an offer for money to help NJ Transit. Those NJ residents who think they would benefit from congestion pricing because their commute does not involve driving (and so someone else will pay) are pushing Murphy to settle.

There is of course no guaranty that any settlement funds earmarked for NJ Transit will actually get there, and even if those dollars do, the Legislature can just cut other funds that would have gone there to pay for other, more vote-getting priorities.

Jay Bohn

January 2, 2025

Copyright 2025 by Jay Bohn.

Biden’s Commutation of 90% of Federal Death Sentences Doesn’t Go Far Enough

For those who are Christian, the Christmas holy day is a good time to reflect on the virtues of mercy and forgiveness. Coincidentally, every four years it coincides with the closing days of a presidential term, a time when presidential pardons and other acts of clemency are common, in part because the political price to be paid is discounted for the incumbent, who is unlikely to run for political office ever again.1

In addition to the now customary and tongue-in-check Thanksgiving turkey pardon, on December 1, shortly after the 2024 presidential election, President Biden granted his son Hunter a broad pardon, asserting that Hunter had been singled out by his political opponents. On December 12, 2024, citing America’s promise of possibility and second chances, President Biden announced that he had pardoned 39 people and commuted the sentences of nearly 1,500 others. As the public reaction to these actions has shown, such actions will often be controversial and a source of further grief to those who were the victims of the recipient’s conduct.

The President’s constitutional prerogative to show mercy is not limited to those whom he believes have been unjustly prosecuted or who have been rehabilitated. Until a few days ago there were 40 people under sentence of death for federal crimes. On December 23 President Biden announced that he was commuting the sentences of 37 of them to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

After expressing “condemn[ation of] for these murderers, grie[f] for the victims of their despicable acts, and ache for all the families who have suffered unimaginable and irreparable loss,” the President stated that “guided by my conscience and my experience as a public defender, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Vice President, and now President, I am more convinced than ever that we must stop the use of the death penalty at the federal level.”

There has been the predictable response by political partisans and relatives of the victims who will not get to experience eye-for-an-eye justice. I, on the other hand, do not believe that President Biden went far enough; as an opponent of capital punishment in all cases, I would have preferred that all federal death sentences had been commuted.

President Biden’s statement itself did not explain the exceptions. An accompanying “fact sheet” rephrased the President’s stated belief in the need to stop the use of the death penalty at the federal level–a categorical statement–into one with an exception for “cases of terrorism and hate-motivated mass murder.” Sounds to me that like some aide wanted to leave some wiggle room. Which is the President’s true position?

The death penalty is either always wrong or sometimes right. If not always wrong, the decision to impose it becomes a matter of degree. If President Biden truly believes, as his statement says, “that we must stop the use of the death penalty at the federal level,” then are the three exceptions being sacrificed on the altar of political expediency?

Jay Bohn

December 26, 2024

Copyright 2024 by Jay Bohn.

  1. As is true for so many other things, the end of President Trump’s first term is an exception to this statement. Not only did he (successfully) repeat his quest for a second term after losing his 2020 re-election bid, but experience probably convinced him that there would be no political price to be paid for anything he did. ↩︎

The Merits of a Public Policy Do Not Justify the Executive’s Taking a Dive in a Challenge to a Statute

Last Friday the Star-Ledger‘s on-line incarnation, NJ.com, published a guest column by three members of a group opposed to the exemption in New Jersey’s Smoke Free Air Act for smoking in casinos. Among the topics of conversation was a lawsuit brought by that group seeking to have the exemption declared unconstitutional.1

They certainly have a legitimate argument that the allowing of smoking in casinos (when it is prohibited in almost all other public indoor venues) is bad public policy, but I part ways with them in their criticism of Governor Murphy and the commissioner of health for defending the statute in the litigation and in urging them to stop defending the lawsuit.

Policy choices like this are for the Legislature to make. Unless a statute’s unconstitutionality is clear, the executive branch has a duty to defend the statute in court. Now that a trial judge has upheld the legality of the exemption, there is all the more obligation on their part to defend that decision in the promised appeal.

Consider if it were otherwise. A governor could have a political crony challenge a policy the governor does not like and then tell the attorney general not to respond. Eventually a default would be entered. Absent discovery of and reporting on the lawsuit by the news media, the Legislature may not even know that there is a challenge. This is a misuse of the court system.

Jay Bohn

September 26, 2024

  1. This article reports on the dismissal of the lawsuit. ↩︎

Copyright 2024 by Jay Bohn.

Truth in Acronyms: YIMBY or YIYBY?

NIMBY is a well-known acronym for “not in my back yard,” referring to those who are opposed to the nearby construction of LULUs (another acronym, this one standing for “locally unwanted land uses”).1 Such opposition reflects the reality that the benefits of a particular development are often more geographically dispersed than its negative impacts.

In this case the term “back yard” is metaphorical; it means near my property, not actually on it. With the exception of utility infrastructure easements, development in my actual back yard will bring particular benefits to me that outweigh the detriments (to me), else I wouldn’t do it.

NIMBYism may not reflect opposition to a particular development anywhere, just not close by. If we have to have it, put it somewhere else: somebody else should “pay” for the social good that comes from it.

More recently I have seen the term YIMBY (yes in my back yard) touted as the opposite of NIMBY. Unlike NIMBY, which is usually used pejoratively, YIMBY is adopted as a badge of honor, if not moral superiority. See, for example, YIMBYs for Harris.

But I’m not convinced. You see, NIMBY has two opposites. YIMBY is one, but YIMBY means that I will accept a nearby development that others don’t want. That’s not what they’re pushing. I doubt that most YIMBYs for Harris want a lot more housing in their own back yards. Not to pick on him, but one of the politicians listed among YIMBYs for Harris is current Jersey City mayor (and New Jersey governor hopeful) Steve Fulop. A few years ago, Fulop made NIMBY-like noises against allowing parking on the streets near his Rhode Island vacation home to accommodate public access for surfers.

Most of the examples of YIMBYism I see discussed really seek to channel development to someone’s else’s back yard: “yes in your back yard,” or the less pronounceable YIYBY.2

Look, I get it. The so-called YIMBYs are right that we have a housing shortage and the cost of housing is increasing because demand is outstripping supply. I have said as much previously. But, if we’re going to build more housing, it’s going to be in someone’s back yard and the political process, as ever, is going to pick winners and losers, so let’s at least be honest about that and try to make those choices on a rational basis and not just raw power.

Jay Bohn

September 23, 2024

Copyright 2024 by Jay Bohn.

  1. See the Wikipedia article for the development of the term and variations of it. ↩︎
  2. Although I came to the acronym YIYBY independently, I am not the first. See, for example, these writings by Arlingtonians for Upzoning Transparency and 48hills, both of which use the term. ↩︎

Election Follies

As a resident of New Jersey, I have been treated to a good seat to view the run up to the upcoming election. I write not of the Presidential contest, which until yesterday looked like it was going to be a rematch of 2020 that few wanted but we didn’t seem able to avoid,1 but of the New Jersey Senate race.

Democratic incumbent Robert Menendez, our senior senator, has served since he was appointed by Governor Corzine to fill the vacancy created by Corzine’s election as governor. Menendez was the subject of a recall attempt2 and much later a corruption trial that resulted in a hung jury. Although he politically survived both events, his second indictment, last September, accompanied by tales of gold bars and jacket pockets stuffed with cash, led to his recent conviction (nobody survives gold bars) on all sixteen charges and intensified calls for his resignation or expulsion from the Senate.

Immediately following the indictment, Representative Andy Kim said that he would run for the seat in the Democratic primary. Kim’s most prominent announced opponent, N.J. First Lady Tammy Murphy, also sought the seat and had the advantage of her husband, the governor’s, party influence. This influence was potentially decisive as New Jersey primaries feature what is known as “the party line” which allows the county party to group favored candidates together, consigning others to “ballot Siberia.”3

Kim promptly filed a federal lawsuit challenging the county line (a similar lawsuit had been pending for a while) and sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit the use of the county line in the 2024 Democratic4 primary and replace it with the office block style ballot used everywhere else.

A number of legislative leaders promised to address the matter (eventually) in an effort to keep the judge from entering the injunction. County party leaders were apoplectic about the threat to their influence. Ultimately, after the damage was done, Tammy Murphy did not pursue the nomination.

Although Menendez did not file a petition to run in the Democratic primary, he did qualify to run as an independent, and his presence on the ballot just might siphon enough votes away from Kim to allow the Republican5 candidate a chance to be the first Republican elected to the Senate from New Jersey since 1972.

While Menedez’s conviction does not disqualify him from the Senate, it promptly led to many Democrats calling for him to resign or be expelled. If either event happens, Governor Murphy would have the power to appoint a replacement who would serve for the balance of the term (unless Murphy also calls a special election). Kim would seem to be the logical choice for the Democratic governor, but remaining sour grapes might lead Murphy to appoint someone else, even his wife, as a caretaker.

Jay Bohn

July 22, 2024

  1. Actually, as I was writing this post. the growing chorus of Democratic elites are desperately trying to dump the candidate who won their primaries, incumbent Joseph Biden, succeeded and replace him with . . . (well, that’s not the important bit). ↩︎
  2. Then lieutenant governor/secretary of state Kim Guadagno correctly determined that Ney Jersey’s state laws on the procedure could not authorize the recall of a federal officeholder. ↩︎

Supreme Court to Hear Immunity Argument

This morning the United States Supreme Court will hear argument in Trump v. United States (the caption says it all) in which the former President argues that he is immune from any criminal liability for the charges brought in that case. The argument (as all Supreme Court arguments) will be live-streamed on the Court’s website (https://www.supremecourt.gov) and will be available in both audio and transcript form later today. (After the argument I will edit the foregoing sentences to provide the links.)

It is clear of course that Donald Trump’s strategy all along has been delay, delay, delay, hoping that he can run out the clock to prevent any of the criminal trials to proceed before he hopes to be re-elected. Although it has not worked perfectly (the New York state trial is on-going as I write this), he has been largely successful, a disappointment to those who were hoping for some magic bullet to prevent either his re-election or the Hobson’s choice between him and President Biden.

Whatever one ultimately thinks about the merits of presidential immunity, it is an important question that the Supreme Court is going to have to answer and so here I part ways with those who argue that the mere fact that the Court has taken this case is proof of its partisanship. See, for example, Ankush Khadori’s Politico column, How to Know If the Supreme Court Is in the Tank for Trump.

Jay Bohn

April 25, 2024

Supreme Court Writes Finis to Trump Ballot Challenges

Just when you thought you were free of my Section 3 rantings (my last post was about something else), they’re back. Well, on Monday the Supreme Court issued its decision in Trump v. Anderson, and I have to talk about it.

Newsflash: all nine justices agreed that the State of Colorado does not get to exclude Trump from the ballot because the presidency is a national office and individual states do not get to judge the Section 3 disqualification for it. Four of the justices wrote separate opinions (one by Justice Barrett and another jointly by Justices Sotomayer, Kagan, and Jackson) saying that was enough and the Court should have gone no farther. But the other five justices supported a per curiam opinion which indicates that at least for federal offices, Section 3 may not be enforced at all in the absence of Congressional legislation.

The end result is that the Supreme Court of Colorado was reversed, Trump gets on that ballot, and any challenge in any other State is doomed. While it is not a result with which I disagree as a legal proposition,1 I am most concerned about what it says about the ability of States to exclude otherwise ineligible candidates from their ballots, such as persons who are not citizens or do not meet the constitutional age or residency requirements, seemingly inconsistent with one of Justice Gorsuch’s decisions when he was on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals: “[A] state’s legitimate interest in protecting the integrity and practical functioning of the political process permits it to exclude from the ballot candidates who are constitutionally prohibited from assuming office.”2

It also leads to a greater possibility of inconsistency as I discussed in Takes on Trump v. Anderson Oral Argument 3: National or State Office Should Not Make a Difference; “if Candidate A is an insurrectionist, Candidate A should not be eligible for any office, from dog catcher to President.”

It may be that the majority wanted to foreclose piece-meal challenges to individual acts during a hypothetical second Trump administration.

I have to read the decision a few more times.

Jay Bohn

March 8, 2024

  1. See my posts from last September, starting here. ↩︎
  2. Hassan v. Colorado, 495 F. App’x 947 (10th Cir. 2012). ↩︎

Higher EV Registration Fees and Tax “Fairness”

Nobody likes taxes, but they would not be so bad if other people would pay their “fair share” so that I could pay less. You hear this all the time, often in the context that “the rich” should always pay more income taxes. What brings this to mind right now, however, is a Star Ledger guest column entitled “EVs tear up N.J. roads. They should pay their fair share to fix them” by Matthew Hale (published on-line on March 1, 2024, and in print on March 3, 2024). Professor Hale wants to buy a pickup truck, just because, but is ticked that he would have to pay more than his fair share into the Transportation Trust Fund in the form of gasoline taxes.

Several years ago, Governor Christie approved an increase in the gasoline tax to fund transit improvements. The tax amount is adjusted annually to produce a fixed amount of revenue. Most recently the tax was increased by 0.9 cents per gallon to 42.3 cents per gallon, making New Jersey the seventh highest. NJ’s gas tax to rise in October | NJ Spotlight News.

All-electric vehicles of course do not use gas, so their drivers do not pay a gas tax. Hale thinks this is unfair, especially because EVs tend to be heavier than other cars, and he has just the solution: there is a proposal to cut the gas tax by 33%, and Hale suggests that the $150 million that would be lost to the TTF be made up by increasing the annual registration fee for the 123,000 EVs registered in New Jersey by $1,220 a year. If you think that’s fair, ponder these points:

  • Even if heavier vehicles cause more damage to roads in something close to a direct relationship to the weight difference (and this presumes that the TTF merely repairs existing roads and bridges), surely another factor, likely of more significance, is the distance travelled.
  • The 33% cut is just an arbitrary number, at least with regard to Hale’s fairness point. The drivers of the 123,000 EVs (Hale’s figure; I believe this also includes plug-in hybrids) would be paying one-third of the annual TTF levy while the drivers of the other 2,412,248 vehicles registered in New Jersey would pay two-thirds.1 This means that the EV owner is paying, in extra registration fees, just under ten times the amount that the average gasoline-powered car is paying in New Jersey gasoline tax.2 Or put it this way, the $1,220 additional registration fee equates to the tax paid on 2,884 gallons of gasoline (or about 4,305 gallons if the gas tax is actually reduced by 33%).

And none of this considers the environmental benefit from the elimination of tail pipe emissions.3 Governments use tax policy to incentivize certain behaviors all the time.

As a final question about fairness, is it fair that I, who has never been a consumer of the New Jersey public education system, either as a student or parent, should have to pay thousands of dollars a year in school taxes?

Jay Bohn

March 4, 2024

  1. Actually less, because some portion would be paid by out-of-state drivers who purchase gas in New Jersey. ↩︎
  2. I’m mixing statistical sources, so these numbers are not as exact as they seem. The 123,0000 number comes from Hale’s editorial. According to U.S.: total number of cars by state | Statista, based on 2021 numbers, New Jersey had 2,535,248 registered vehicles. I merely subtracted the one from the other. ↩︎
  3. I do realize that the production of electricity to charge EVs does itself have environmental impact, but individual internal combustion engines do pollute more than any public utility. ↩︎

Takes on Trump v. Anderson Oral Argument 4: The Significance of Collateral Estoppel

This is another post about a small part of the U.S. Supreme Court oral argument (transcript | audio) in Trump v. Anderson

During the argument Justice Alito asked both Jonathan Mitchell, President Trump’s attorney, and Shannon Stevenson, Solicitor General of Colorado who was appearing on behalf of the Secretary of State, about “non-mutual collateral estoppel.”

Collateral estoppel is a legal doctrine which essentially says that a litigant gets the metaphorical one bite at the apple on a particular issue. If in one suit an issue was decided against A and in favor of B, then A did not get to contest that issue if it was relevant to a different litigation against B. Earlier formulations of the doctrine required mutuality: it only applied it if the parties involved were the same (or “in privity”). C cannot come in and say that the issue was already resolved against A.

However, some jurisdictions now recognize “non-mutual collateral estoppel” which would permit C to do that very thing. Justice Alito was concerned that Colorado’s Supreme Court’s decision could be binding on the whole country:

JUSTICE ALITO:  The consequences of what the Colorado Supreme Court did, some people claim, would be quite severe.  Would it not permit –would it not lead to the possibility that other states would say, using their choice-of-law rules and their rules on –on collateral estoppel, that there’s non-mutual collateral estoppel against former President Trump and so the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court could effectively decide this question for many other states, perhaps all other states? Could it not lead to that consequence?

Mitchell, who might have been expected to stoke just such fears, said that it would not happen with respect to the Colorado decision:

MR. MITCHELL:  I don’t think so because Colorado law does not recognize non-mutual collateral estoppel.  And I believe the preclusive effect of the decision would be determined by Colorado law rather than the law of another state.

Justice Alito also raised the question during Stevenson’s argument:

JUSTICE ALITO: Suppose a state that does recognize non-mutual collateral estoppel makes a determination, using whatever procedures it decides to adopt, that a particular candidate is an insurrectionist.

Could that have a cascading effect, and so the decision by a court in one state –the decision by a single judge whose factual findings are given deference, maybe an elected trial judge, would have potentially an enormous effect on the candidates who run for president across the country? Is that something we should be concerned about?

Stevenson did not think it a matter of great concern because there is already “a huge amount of disparity in the candidates that end up on the ballot on –in different states in every [presidential] election.”1

I’m pretty sure that it is not an ideal solution to have the potential of either disparate decisions on the eligibility of an individual for office, especially the presidency, or allowing forum shopping to find a highly partisan judge whose decision would be subject to deferential review as to factual matters and could be binding on the whole country. There should be a national forum for all Section 3 questions.

Jay Bohn

February 29, 2024

  1. As I stated in the last post, there is not actually one national presidential election but 51 different contests for the choosing of electors. ↩︎